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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 890086-CA 
v. : 
EARLY GILBERT HODGES, JR., : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation and 
executing the sentence, originally stayed, for attempted sexual 
abuse of a child, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1989), in the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the lack of written findings violate 
defendant's right to due process? 
2. Did the evidence support the trial court's decision 
to revoke defendant's probation? 
3. Did the trial court violate Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(9)(e) (Supp. 1989) in revoking defendant's probation? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(9)(e) (Supp. 1989): 
After hearing, the court shall make 
findings of fact. Upon a finding that the 
defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation 
revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. If 
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed 
shall be executed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) (amended 
1989): 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
months' probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases, the probation period shall 
be terminated, unless earlier terminated by 
the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Early Gilbert Hodges, Jr., pled guilty to 
attempted sexual abuse of a child, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1989) (R. 14-15). 
Defendant was sentenced to a term of zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison. The sentence was stayed and defendant placed 
on probation for a period of 18 months with the condition, inter 
alia, that he enter, participate in and complete the program at 
Bonneville Community Correctional Center (R. 17-18). Upon 
hearing, after the issuance of an order to show cause, the trial 
court revoked defendant's probation and ordered defendant 
committed to the Utah State Prison in accordance with his 
original sentence. Defendant filed his notice of appeal from the 
probation revocation on January 18, 1989. 
_o_ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant pled guilty to attempted sexual abuse of a 
child and was sentenced to a term of zero to five years in the 
Utah State Prison (R. 14-15, 17). Execution of the sentence was 
stayed, and defendant was placed on probation for an 18 month 
period. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) (amended 
1989). As a condition of probation, defendant was ordered to 
enter, participate in and complete the sexual treatment program 
at the Bonneville Community Correctional Center (R. 17-18, T.B. 
11). After defendant had been in the program for approximately 
eight months, he was returned to the Salt Lake County Jail. An 
order to show cause issued stating that defendant had violated 
the terms and conditions of his probation (R. 19). The 
supporting affidavit alleged that defendant had failed to 
"[e]nter and complete the Bonneville Sex Offender Program." 
At defendant's probation revocation hearing the trial 
court heard from two psychologists who treated defendant at the 
Bonneville Community Correctional Center. The first, Rosalita 
Defendant contends that the affidavit in support of the order 
to show cause was amended to include "failure to participate" in 
the Bonneville program as an allegation (Br. of App. 15 n.3). 
However, the State can find no evidence that such an amendment 
was made. Both the record and the court transcript indicate only 
that the state alleges was that defendant did not enter and 
complete the Bonneville program (R. 28, T.C. 2). However, a 
review of the transcript of the revocation hearing and 
defendant's appellate brief indicates that defendant's 
participation in the Bonneville program was acknowledged by all 
parties involved as a substantive element in the probation 
revocation proceeding. The State also agrees that defendant's 
participation in the program was a substantive element in the 
probation condition at issue here and incorporates that condition 
in its argument. 
therapy on a weekly basis (T.D. 4). Dr. Cespedes testified that 
during defendant's eight months in the program he had made 
minimal, if any, progress (T. 6). She stated that defendant's 
personality traits made it very difficult for him to change and 
that his long history of mental problems and entrenched behavior 
hindered his ability to progress (T.D. 5-6). She stated her 
belief that defendant would require long-term treatment to reduce 
his probability of reoffending and that it would take a minimum 
of four years in treatment to have any appreciable effect on 
defendant's behavior (T.D. 5, 7). Bonneville offered a short-
term program, 18 months to two years, and was not designed to 
deal with defendant's type of problem (T.D. 7). She stated 
further that, upon consultation with physicians from the Veterans 
Administration Hospital, who monitored defendant's admittedly 
heavy dependence upon prescribed medications, she was told that 
the medication had no impact on his behavior and ability to 
progress in therapy (T.D. 7-8). She stated that it was her 
belief, as well as the belief of the physician and the other 
psychologists, that defendant had been manipulative and using his 
medication as an excuse to justify his behavior and that any 
behavioral improvement had been due to confrontation, not a 
change in medication (T.D. 9). 
The second psychologist to testify was Stephen Kramer, 
Director of the Bonneville Sex Offender Program. Dr. Kramer had 
treated defendant in weekly sex modification therapy over the 
eight month period defendant was at Bonneville (T.D. 14-15). 
Defendant had had great difficulty with the therapy, his 
assignments often had been done incorrectly, and Dr. Kramer had 
spent considerable additional time with him (T.D. 15). He stated 
that defendant had many medication and medical problems, 
including erectile dysfunctiuon, which prevented him from being 
tested with a plethysmograph to measure sexual arousal (T.D. 18-
19). Dr. Kramer stated that defendant had made minimal progress 
while at Bonneville, including the program in group and 
individual therapy, assignments completed in sex modification 
therapy, grades in course work and social and interpersonal 
skills (T.D. 19). He believed that significant progress would 
have taken at least four years and that that was not within the 
parameters of the Bonneville program (T.D. 19-20). Dr. Kramer 
stated that to reduce defendant's risk of reoffending, defendant 
would have to bring his mental capacity and physical disabilities 
under control, get his medications under control, get basic 
learning functions improved and work on his own motivation (T.D. 
20-21). He felt that defendant would perform for awhile and then 
stop, and thus he questioned defendant's real motivation in the 
program (T.D. 21, 23). He did not believe that any community-
based program was sufficient to meet defendant's needs (T.D. 21). 
Upon cross examination, Dr. Kramer stated that he had 
complimented defendant on improvement after his return from the 
Veteran's Administration Hospital and medication adjustment, that 
defendant had some ability problems and that defendant could not 
be blamed for his inability to get erections (T.D. 22-24). 
However, he reiterated his belief that defendant's motivation was 
suspect (T.D. 23). 
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Defendant testified that he worked as hard as he could 
at Bonneville, that he wanted further treatment, that he felt 
more alert after his medications were adjusted and believed that 
he had passed his assignments after his return from the Veteran's 
Administration Hospital (T.D. 24-28). 
The trial court found that defendant did not 
effectively participate in and complete the program (T.D. 39). 
Having failed to do so, the court found that defendant had 
violated the conditions of probation and revoked the probation 
(T.D. 39). It ordered the original sentence to be carried out 
with a recommendation that defendant immediately be placed in the 
sex offender program at the Utah State Prison (T.D. 40). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lack of written findings of fact in the probation 
revocation proceeding did not violate defendant's right to due 
process because an official transcript of the proceeding was 
sufficient to inform defendant of the facts and evidence the 
court relied upon in reaching its decision. 
Revocation of probation is within the sound discretion 
of the court, and the evidence of a probation violation supported 
the court's decision. 
In revoking defendant's probation, the court did not 
violate Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(9)(e) (Supp. 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LACK OF FORMAL WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT 
DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE 
PROCESS WHEN AN OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
PROCEEDING INFORMED THE DEFENDANT OF THE 
FACTS AND EVIDENCE THE COURT RELIED ON IN 
REACHING ITS DECISION. 
Defendant argues that the failure of the trial court to 
make written findings of fact concerning defendant's probation 
revocation hearing violated defendant's right to due process in 
that defendant was not informed of which probation terms the 
court believed he had violated or the evidence the court relied 
upon. However, defendant failed to object to the absence of 
written findings at the trial court, and the failure constitutes 
a waiver. See State v. Steqgell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983) 
("[T]his Court has long refused to review matters for the first 
time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was made in 
the trial court.") 
Should this Court decide to review the merits of 
defendant's argument, it will see that written findings are not 
always required in a probation revocation proceeding. Defendant 
relies upon two United States Supreme Court cases in support of 
his position, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). In Morrissey, the Court 
articulated a number of requirements necessary in parole 
revocation hearings to protect a person's constitutional due 
process guarantees. One requirement was a "written statement by 
the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for 
revoking parole." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon, the 
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Court extended those due process guarantees to a probationer, 
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782. 
The underlying purpose of written findings is Hto 
assure that the finding of a parole . . . violation . . . [is] 
based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion . . 
[is] informed . . . ." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484. See also 
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 785. Numerous courts have held that, in the 
absence of formal written findings, a transcript of the 
revocation hearing is a sufficient written statement to explain 
the evidence relied upon and the reason for revocation. See, 
e.g., Fleming v. State, 760 P.2d 208 (Okla. Cr. 1988). 
In Morishita v. Morris, 621 P.2d 691 (Utah 1980), the 
Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of the need for written 
findings of fact in a probation revocation proceeding. There, 
the defendant's probation was revoked after a judicial 
proceeding. The judge made no written findings of fact or 
conclusions of law, but a transcript of the proceeding was made. 
The Court stated: 
We are aware of the due process requirements 
set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli [citation 
omitted], for probation revocation 
proceedings, yet find the requirement for 
written findings inapplicable in the instant 
case. First, the standards set forth in 
Gagnon were addressed to administrative 
revocation proceedings which required no 
transcript, no judicial moderator, and no 
counsel, as opposed to the instant 
circumstance of a judicial proceeding with 
_ Q ~ 
probationer being represented by counsel and 
a transcript being maintained. 
Id. at 693 n.l. 
In the instant case, defendant's revocation proceeding 
was before a judge, defendant was represented by counsel, and a 
transcript was made. The trial court relied on the evidence 
presented at the hearing and articulated that reliance as 
follows: 
From what I have heard here, he did not 
participate. He did some things, but he did 
not effectively participate in and he did not 
complete the program. And upon failure to do 
that, he has violated the conditions of his 
probation and so I find that he has violated 
the conditions of his probation. 
(T.D. 38-39). A lack of formal written findings did not violate 
defendant's due process guarantee. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION TO REVOKE DEFENDANT'S PROBATION. 
Defendant argues that the evidence did not support a 
finding by the trial court that defendant violated a term of his 
probation and asserts that the alleged lack of evidentiary 
support violates his right to due process (Br. of App. at 14). 
Defendant cites to Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430 (1973), as 
In a subsequent appeal by the defendant in Morishita from a 
denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that "written findings are constitutionally 
required only if the transcript and record before the judge do 
not enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of the 
judge's decision to revoke probation." Morishita v. Morris, 702 
F.2d 207, 210 (10th Cir. 1983). 
supporting this claim. In that case the trial court revoked the 
defendant's probation because it found that the defendant had 
violated the probation condition that he report to his probation 
officer without delay all "arrests." The defendant had been 
issued a traffic citation and had reported it to his probation 
officer after 11 days. The United States Supreme Court reversed, 
ruling that the issuance of a traffic citation was not an 
"arrest" under the applicable statutes, and a finding by the 
trial court that the defendant had violated his parole for not 
immediately reporting the citation was "so totally devoid of 
evidentiary support as to be invalid under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." Ici. at 432 (citations omitted). 
Buder, where no evidence of a violation existed, is factually 
distinguishable from the instant case, in which the trial court 
reviewed evidence from both the State and defendant and exercised 
its discretion in deciding to revoke defendant's probation. The 
facts here do not rise to the level of a due process violation. 
Defendant also cites Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 
(1983), as supporting his due process claim. In Bearden the 
United States Supreme Court stated that it was fundamentally 
unfair to automatically revoke, without considering alternatives, 
a defendant's probation for failure to pay a fine, as required by 
the conditions of probation, when the defendant had made all 
reasonable attempts to do so. There, the Court limited its 
discussion to issues involved in indigency, discussing both equal 
protection and due process concerns within that context. In a 
subsequent case, Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985), the Court 
specifically declined to extend Bearden beyond indigency cases, 
stating: 
Bearden v. Georgia recognized substantive 
limits on the automatic revocation of 
probation where an indigent defendant is 
unable to pay a fine or restitution. We have 
no occasion . . . to decide whether concerns 
for fundamental fairness prohibit the 
automatic revocation of probation in any 
other context* 
Id. at 611. So limited, an application of Bearden to the 
circumstances of the instant case is improper. 
In attacking the factual basis of the trial court's 
decision to revoke his probation, defendant primarily questions 
the validity of the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of 
the two Bonneville psychologists, Dr. Cespedes and Dr. Kramer. 
Citing State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), defendant 
argues that the State did not lay sufficient foundation for their 
testimonies and also argues that their testimonies were so 
substantively deficient that they could not support the trial 
court's ruling. 
With regard to defendant's foundational argument, no 
such contemporaneous objection was made at the revocation 
hearing. Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, requires that "a 
clear and definite objection" be made at trial to preserve an 
evidentiary error for appeal. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 
34-35 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989). 
In substantively attacking the trial court's reliance 
on the testimonies of Dr. Cespedes and Dr. Kramer, defendant 
fails to recognize the relatively flexible nature of a probation 
revocation proceeding. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 ("We 
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emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of 
parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is 
a narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to 
consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other 
material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal 
trial."). Because it is not a criminal prosecution, a violation 
of probation need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
State v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 558, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (1944); 
State v. Parsons, 104 N.M. 123, 127, 717 P.2d 99, 103 (N.M. App. 
1986); Gronski v. State, 700 P.2d 777, 778 (Wyo. 1985). 
In Utah it is well established that revocation of 
probation is within the sound discretion of the court. In 
Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah 387, 149 P.2d 640 (1944), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The right to suspend imposition of sentence 
and the right to place one on probation is a 
discretionary right. One placed on probation 
has a right to be heard as to whether he has 
violated the conditions upon which suspended 
sentence was based . . . . Upon such a 
hearing, the trial court has the 
discretionary power to continue probation or 
impose sentence, but to authorize termination 
of probation there must be some competent 
evidence of violation of the terms of 
probation. . . . 
When it appears that the trial judge has 
exercised discretion in suspending imposition 
of sentence or in revoking probation and 
imposing sentence, after a hearing as 
heretofore mentioned, the judgment of the 
trial court should not be molested. 
106 Utah at 292, 149 P.2d at 642 (citations omitted). See also 
State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d 487, 488 (Utah 1981). 
Deference to the court's discretion in probation 
revocation matters is in harmony with the underlying 
rehabilitative purpose of probation. That purpose is expressed 
well in State v. Dubish# 236 Kan. 848, 696 P.2d 969 (1985): 
The basic purpose for probation is to provide 
a program whereby an individual is given the 
opportunity to rehabilitate himself without 
institutional confinement under the 
supervision of a probation official and under 
the continuing power of the district court to 
impose institutional punishment for the 
original offense if the probationer abuses 
this opportunity. It permits the sentencing 
judge to give a convicted person the 
opportunity to mend his ways and have his 
freedom under conditions imposed. Probation 
is not granted out of a spirit of leniency, 
but is granted as a result of the evaluation 
of the characteristics of the offender and a 
determination that the offender may respond 
best to supervised control within the 
community and that public safety will not be 
endangered. 
236 Kan. at 853-54, 696 P.2d at 974. 
In the instant case, defendant was placed on probation 
for a period of 18 months. As a condition of his probation 
defendant was ordered to "[e]nter, participate in, and complete 
the program at Bonneville Community Corr. Ct." (R. 18). At his 
sentencing hearing defendant was told by the court that he was to 
"enter into and successfully complete the resident sexual 
treatment program at the Bonneville Community Correctional 
Center" (T.B. 11). The trial court and defendant also had the 
following exchange: 
THE COURT: I am going to be sentencing you 
to prison, but I will be staying the sentence 
with conditions and you better believe, you 
better know you will have to live by every 
condition and out there at that Bonneville 
Community Correction Center, whatever rules 
- i •*_ 
they have, you better cross every "T" and dot 
every "i". You understand that? I want to 
hear you audibly, please, sir. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor, I do 
understand it. 
THE COURT: Your probation officer is your 
ticket for staying out of prison. Whatever 
she says, you better live and breathe about 
it. If she has you back here before me, I 
have no question in my mind what I will do. 
I think you understand that, don't you? 
THE DEFENDANT: (Nods head affirmatively.) 
(T.B. 10). The sentence and the oral communication between the 
court and defendant were sufficiently clear to apprise defendant 
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of his obligations. See State v. Penney, 776 P.2d 91, 93 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied 779 P.2d 688 (1989) (citing Chase v. 
State, 479 P.2d 337, 339 (Alaska 1971)). (M[I]t is necessary 
that sentences be rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to 
avoid the possibility of confusion and injustice"). 
As recounted more specifically supra, at defendant's 
revocation hearing the two psychologists who treated defendant at 
Bonneville each unqualifiedly testified that, due to a 
multiplicity of factors, defendant had made minimal progress at 
Bonneville and that it would take a minimum of four years for the 
Bonneville program to have any appreciable effect on defendant's 
rehabilitation (T.D. 6-7, 19). They both stated further that the 
Defendant further argues that he was never told that his 
probation could be revoked if he were making slow progress or if 
it appeared that he would be unable to complete the program 
within the 18 months probation period (Br. of App. at 12, 13). 
Although never explicitly stated, it was manifest in the 
probation proceeding that defendant carry out the terms of his 
probation within the 18 month probation period, since the court 
would have no jurisdiction over defendant beyond that period. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1987) (amended 1989). 
short-term Bonneville program was not designed to deal with 
defendant's type of problem (T.D. 7, 20). Dr. Cespedes believed 
that defendant had been manipulative, using his medication to 
justify his behavior and inability to progress in therapy (T.D. 
9). Dr. Kramer found that defendant lost motivation and that it 
was difficult to get him to work hard and consistently (T.D. 21). 
After listening to the testimony at the revocation hearing, the 
trial court found that defendant had not effectively participated 
in and completed the Bonneville program. Having failed to do so, 
the court further found that defendant had violated the 
conditions of his probation (T.D. 39). It was solidly within the 
trial court's discretion, having received "some competent 
evidence" of violation of the terms of probation, to revoke 
defendant's probation. Williams v. Harris, 106 Utah at 392, 149 
P.2d at 642. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-18-1(9)(e) (SUPP. 1989) IN REVOKING 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court, in failing to 
articulate the evidence relied upon in revoking defendant's 
probation, violated the requirement in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(9)(e) (Supp. 1989) that there be sufficient evidence to 
establish a probation violation (Br. of App. at 22). The 
provision in question reads as follows: 
After hearing, the court shall make 
findings of fact. Upon a finding that the 
defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation 
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revoked, modified, continued, or that the 
entire probation term commence anew. If 
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be 
sentenced or the sentence previously imposed 
shall be executed. . . . 
On its face the statute does not specify an evidentiary standard, 
and the State can find no cases interpreting section 77-18-
1(9)(e) to mandate a particular standard. The statute requires 
only that the court make a finding that defendant violated the 
conditions of probation, and the court did so in the instant case 
(T.D. 39). As discussed in Point II, supra, because a probation 
revocation hearing is not a criminal prosecution, a violation 
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Probation 
revocation decisions are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and must be supported by some evidence. See Williams v. 
Harris, 106 Utah at 392, 149 P.2d at 642. 
Defendant also argues that the statute, read in 
conjunction with Morrissey and Gagnon, contemplates more than a 
general conclusion that probation has been violated (Br. of App. 
at 22). The State has addressed the substantive requirements of 
Morrissey and Gagnon in Point I, supra, and can find no 
independent statutory basis supporting defendant's assertion. 
_ 1 C 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's revocation of defendant's probation. 
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